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I. INTRODUCTION
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,1 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that a land-use law does not work a taking on its face
if the law substantially advances a legitimate state interest (the
"Agins test").2 In so holding, the Court relied on two substantive
due process cases.' Quoting the Agins test in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission4 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,' the Court later
held that an exaction' does not amount to a taking if the exaction
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1. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
2. Id. at 260.
3. Id. at 260-61. Specifically, the Court cited Nectow v. Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183, 188 (1928), and discussed Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
4. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
5. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
6. For purposes of this Article, exactions are levies that the government
imposes on persons developing their property as a condition of carrying out a
project. See DANIEL L. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 1.09, 9.11 (2003). Used
to shift the costs of infrastructure to developers, exactions usually come in the
form of either "a dedication of land for a public facility, or a fee in lieu of
dedication that the municipality can use to provide a public facility." Id.;
accord Otto J. Hetzel and Kimberly A. Gough, Assessing the Impact of Dolan v.
City of Tigard on Local Governments' Land-Use Powers, in TAKINGS: LAND-
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND
LucAs 228 (David L. Callies ed., 1996); DAVID L. CALLIES, PRESERVING
PARADISE: WHY REGULATION WON'T WORK 37-40 (1994). Ultimately, "any
requirement that a developer provide or do something as a condition to
receiving municipal approval is an exaction." Town of Flower Mound v.
Stafford Estates L.P., 71 S.W.3d 18, 30 n.7 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002), affd, 135
S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004).
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substantially advances a legitimate state interest that would
justify the government's denial of development altogether (the
"Nollan and Dolan test").7 To assure that the exaction advances
this particular type of interest, these cases collectively require the
government to: (1) identify a legitimate state interest that would
be impeded by the development and would thus justify the denial
of the development;8 (2) show that there is a "nexus" between the
interest and the exaction;9 and (3) make an individualized
determination that the exaction bears a "rough proportionality" to
the extent that the interest is impeded by the development."0
Recently, however, the Court overruled the Agins test in
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.," reasoning that the test is not a
valid takings test, but is instead a substantive due process
inquiry." The Court explained that the test is "doctrinally
untenable," 3 because the test does not reveal the extent to which a
person's property rights have been burdened by a land-use law,
and because the finding of a taking presupposes that the
government acted in furtherance of a valid public use or purpose."
Finally, since the Agins test is a substantive due process inquiry,
the Court found that the test's heightened scrutiny was
inappropriate."
Recognizing that Nollan and Dolan relied to some extent on
the Agins test, the Court carefully distinguished the Nollan and
Dolan test from the Agins test."6 The Court noted that the Nollan
and Dolan test was a takings, not substantive due process test,
7. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836 ("The Commission argues that a permit
condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to
issue the permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking. We agree."); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386 ("In
evaluating petitioner's claim, we must first determine whether the 'essential
nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and the permit condition
exacted by the city." (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837)).
8. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
9. Id.
10. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
11. 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
12. Id. at 542. For a thoughtful debate on the viability of the Agins test in
the pre-Lingle era, compare R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation
That Fails to Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a
Regulatory Taking, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 353 (2004), with John D.
Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 ENVTL. L. 853
(1999), and John D. Echeverria, Takings and Errors, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1047
(2000).
13. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544 (emphasis omitted).
14. Id. at 2084. Public use is, of course, "coterminous" with public purpose.
See Hawai'i Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
15. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544-45.
16. Id. at 545-48.
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and that it was a special application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine."7 Hence, the Court concluded that the Nollan
and Dolan test was not "disturbed" by its decision to overrule the
Agins test.'8
This Article examines and reinforces the Court's conclusion
that the Nollan and Dolan test remains a viable takings test after
Lingle.9 Part II provides background, looking to the doctrinal
development of the Nollan and Dolan test. Part III examines the
Lingle decision, focusing on the Court's reasons for overruling the
Agins test. Part IV explores the Lingle Court's treatment of the
Nollan and Dolan test, reaffirming that the Lingle Court's decision
to overrule the Agins test did not disturb the Nollan and Dolan
test.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE NOLLAN AND DOLAN TEST
A. Agins v. City of Tiburon
In Agins, plaintiffs "acquired five acres of unimproved land in
the city of Tiburon, Cal[ifornial, for residential development."2
Thereafter, the city adopted two ordinances which placed
plaintiffs' land in a "Residential Planned Development and Open
Space Zone."2' Under this zoning classification, plaintiffs' de-
velopment was limited to "one-family dwellings, accessory
buildings, and open-space uses."22 Moreover, the zoning class-
ification's density restrictions only permitted plaintiffs to "build
between one and five single-family residences on their 5-acre
tract. " ' After a failed attempt to condemn their land, plaintiffs
filed a complaint which sought, among other things, a declaration
that "the zoning ordinances were facially unconstitutional,"
because, through the ordinances, "the city had taken their
property without just compensation in violation of the
17. Id. at 547-48.
18. Id. at 548.
19. See 13 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 79E.03 [6] [a] [iii] (2005) ("[The Agins] nexus test served as an important
foundation for the 'essential nexus' test applicable to exactions, and may be
subsumed into that test." (citation and footnotes omitted)); John D.
Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy, 35
ENVTL. L. REP. 10577, 10580 (2005) (observing that the Court reaffirmed
Nollan and Dolan in Lingle); Bridget Remington, Land Use Planning and
Zoning: Takings, 35 STETSON L. REV. 706, 708 (2006) (noting the Court's
assertion that the "substantially advances" language in Nollan and Dolan was
used differently in Lingle).
20. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257 (1980).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."24 The superior court granted
the city's demur,25 and the Supreme Court of California affirmed. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States also affirmed.27 In
an opinion by Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., the Court
framed the issue as "whether the mere enactment of the zoning
ordinances constitutes a taking." ' Citing Nectow v. City of
Cambridge," a case which involved an as-applied substantive due
process challenge to a zoning ordinance," the Court observed that
the "application of a general zoning law to particular property
effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests."" To illustrate this principle, the Court
discussed Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.3" as an example,33
which, much like Nectow, concerned a landowner's facial
substantive due process challenge to a zoning ordinance. 4 The
Court explained that the zoning laws in Euclid withstood a facial
attack because, among other things, they "bore a substantial
relationship to the public welfare."35
Applying these principles to the ordinances at issue, the
Court concluded that the "zoning ordinances substantially advance
legitimate governmental goals."36 The Court reasoned that the
"State of California has determined that the development of local
open-space plans will discourage the 'premature and unnecessary
conversion of open-space land to urban uses."'37 The ordinances,
which placed tight restrictions on density, were thus "exercises of
the city's police power to protect [its] residents ... from the ill
effects of urbanization."38 Protection against the ill effects of
urbanization, according to the Court, was undeniably a legitimate
state interest. 39 The Court held, therefore, that the city's zoning
ordinances advanced the legitimate governmental goal of
protecting citizens against the ill effects of urbanization by
24. Id. at 258.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 258-59.
27. Id. at 263.
28. Id. at 260.
29. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
30. Id. at 185.
31. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188).
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
33. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395-97).
34. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
35. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395-97).
36. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
37. Id. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 65561(b) (West. Supp.
1979)).
38. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261 (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
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preserving open-space.' °
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan, plaintiffs sought a coastal development permit
from the California Coastal Commission (the Commission) to
demolish the house on their land and replace it with a "three-
bedroom house in keeping with the rest of the neighborhood."4 1
The Commission then informed plaintiffs that the permit would
likely be granted subject to the condition that plaintiffs "allow the
public an easement to pass across a portion of their property.
42
Plaintiffs protested the condition, but the Commission "overruled
their objections and granted the permit subject to their recordation
of a deed restriction granting the easement."43 The Commission
found that the easement would facilitate the public's access to the
beach. ' After an appeal to and remand from the superior court,45
the Commission reaffirmed the condition's validity,46 finding that
"the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean,
thus contributing to the development of a wall of residential
structures that would prevent the public psychologically from
realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every
right to visit."47 Additionally, the Commission found that the
"effects of construction of the house, along with other area
development, would cumulatively burden the public's ability to
traverse to and along the shorefront."48  On these bases, the
commission concluded that it could impose the easement condition
to offset the public burdens imposed by the house by "providing
additional lateral access to the public beaches in the form of an
easement across [plaintiffs'] property."49 Three state court appeals
followed to no avail.50
The Supreme Court reversed.5' In an opinion written by
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court initially observed:
Had [the Commission] simply required the [plaintiff] to make an
40. Id.
41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Specifically, the superior court held that the condition could not be
imposed "absent evidence that their proposed development would have a direct
adverse impact on public access to the beach," and remanded the case back to
the commission for a determination of that issue. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 828-29 (quotation and ellipsis omitted).
48. Id. at 829 (quotation omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 829-31.
51. Id. at 842.
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easement across their beachfront available to the public on a
permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach,
rather than conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their
agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a
52taking.
Such a requirement would undoubtedly result in plaintiffs' loss of
their fundamental right to exclude others, which is "'one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property,'" said the Court.' Reframing the issue,
the Court stated: "Given, then, that requiring uncompensated
conveyance of the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the question becomes whether requiring it to be
conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the
outcome."' Quoting Agins, the Court reaffirmed that a "land use
regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advances
legitimate state interests."'55 The Court explained that "a broad
range of governmental purposes" qualify.5"
Turning to the facts before it, the Court assumed, for the sake
of argument, that the Commission's proposed purposes were
indeed legitimate, i.e., "protecting the public's ability to seek the
beach, assisting the public in overcoming the 'psychological
barrier' to using the beach created by a developed shorefront, and
preventing congestion on the public beaches."57  On this
assumption, the Court conceded that the Commission
"unquestionably would be able to deny the [plaintiffs] their permit
outright if their new house.., would substantially impede these
purposes.""8
Interpreting the "substantially advances" standard, the Court
agreed with the Commission that "a permit condition that serves
the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking."59 Applying this principle to
the instant case, the Court concluded that the Commission's
purportedly legitimate state interest in "protect[ing] the public's
ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new
house," would be served, for example, by "a viewing spot on
[plaintiffs] property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean
52. Id. at 831.
53. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 433 (1982)).
54. Id. at 834.
55. Id. (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260) (brackets omitted).
56. Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 835.
58. Id. at 835-36 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
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their new house would interfere.' ° The Court reasoned:
Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of
continuous access to the property, would have to be considered a
taking if it were not attached to a development permit, the
Comission's assumed power to forbid construction of the house in
order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include
the power to condition construction upon some concession by the
owner, even a concession of property rights, that serves the same
end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be
a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it
would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an
alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose
is not.6'
On the other hand, the Court cautioned that "[t]he evident
constitutional propriety disappears... if the condition substituted
for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the
justification for the prohibition." 2 The Court observed that "the
lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction converts that purpose to something other than
what it was." The original "purpose then becomes ... the ob-
taining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose,
but without payment of compensation," said the Court.'
"Whatever may be the outer limits of 'legitimate state interests' in
the takings and land-use context, this is not one of them."' Put
differently, the state does not have a legitimate interest in
avoiding its constitutional duty to pay just compensation. As a
final admonition to local governments, the Court observed that
"unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a
valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of
extortion."'
Putting these principles into practice, the Court stated that
the commission had found that plaintiffs' new house would
"interfere with 'visual access' to the beach," which would in turn
"interfere with the desire of people who drive past the [plaintiffs']
house to use the beach, thus creating a 'psychological barrier' to
'access."'6 Scoffing at the commission's finding, the Court iden-
tified two impossibilities:
60. Id.
61. Id. at 836-37 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 837.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
1981)) (emphasis added).
66. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
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It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the [plaintiffs']
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of
the [plaintiffs'] new house.
The Court thus concluded that "the Commission's imposition of the
permit condition cannot be treated as an exercise of its land-use
power for any of these purposes."' Because the Court reached this
conclusion, it did not address the question of "how close a 'fit'
between the condition and the burden is required." 9 The Court
answered that question in Dolan.
C. Dolan v. City of Tigard
In Dolan, plaintiff owned a plumbing and electric supply store
which covered about 9,700 square feet, and included a gravel
parking lot.7 ° The westerly portion of the land fell under a 100-
floodplain, bordering a creek.71 Plaintiff applied for a permit to
redevelop the site, which called for nearly doubling the size of the
store and paving the parking lot.72 The city planning commission
granted plaintiffs permit application subject to conditions imposed
by the city's development code.73 The city required that plaintiff
dedicate the portion of her land lying within the 100-year
floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage system and that
she dedicate an additional fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the
floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.74 These dedications
comprised ten percent of plaintiffs property. 5 Plaintiff then
applied for variances from the conditions under the development
code, and the city denied her request . In denying the variance,
the city found that it was reasonable to assume that future use of
the pathway dedication by customers and employees "could offset
some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and lessen the
increase in traffic congestion,"77 and that the floodplain dedication
67. Id. at 838-39.
68. Id. at 839.
69. Id. at 838.
70. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 380.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 380-81.
77. Id. at 381-82 (alteration in original and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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would address the anticipated increased storm water flow from the
anticipated increase in impervious surface area."8 The city council
then approved the city's final order.7 ' The order was subsequently
affirmed by the Land Use Board of Appeals, the Court of Appeals
of Oregon, and the Supreme Court of Oregon."°
The United States Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist."' Retracing its steps in Nollan, the Court
observed that "had the city simply required petitioner to dedicate a
strip of land along [the creek] for public use, rather than
conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on
such a dedication, a taking would have occurred," because plaintiff
would have lost her right to exclude others."' Returning to Agins,
the Court once again declared that "[a] land use regulation does
not effect a taking if it 'substantially advances legitimate state
interests."''
The Court then explained that its exactions takings
jurisprudence was an application of the "well-settled doctrine of
'unconstitutional conditions."'' That doctrine forbids the govern-
ment from requiring "a person to give up a constitutional
right... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship
to the property."5 The constitutional right at issue in the case of
exactions is "the right to receive just compensation when property
is taken for a public use."'
After finding that Nollan's nexus requirement was satisfied, 7
the Court addressed the question it left unanswered in Nollan:
"whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's
permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected
impact of [plaintiffs] proposed development."' s After reviewing the
city's findings with respect to each exaction, the Court reframed
the issue as whether the city's findings were "constitutionally
sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on
[plaintiffs] building permit."9  Consulting the considerable ex-
78. Id. at 382.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 382-83.
81. Id. at 396.
82. Id. at 384 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831).
83. Id. at 385 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
84. Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 386-87.
88. Id. at 388 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834).
89. Id. at 389.
20071
The John Marshall Law Review
perience of the states, the Court examined the approaches the
states had taken in resolving this issue.' Ultimately, the Court
adopted the "'reasonable relationship' test," which was the
prevailing law in the majority of the states, because that test was
consistent with "the federal constitutional norm."9 '
However, the Court declined to adopt the reasonable
relationship test's phrasing." The Court reasoned that such
language was "confusingly similar to the term 'rational basis'
which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 Instead, the
Court embraced the term "rough proportionality," since such a
term encapsulated "the requirement of the Fifth Amendment.""
By "rough," the Court meant that "[n]o precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."" In the end, the Court found that both the
floodplain and pedestrian/bicycle pathway exaction failed this
test."
In summary, if the government's exaction of a landowner's
property rights would have constituted a taking of the landowner's
property rights had the government taken those rights outright,
then the heightened standards which the Court formulated in
Nollan and Dolan apply to the government's action.97 Taken
together, Nollan and Dolan's heightened standards require the
government to make three showings in order to impose exactions
and avoid a taking under the Fifth Amendment. First, the
government must identify a public problem caused by the proposed
development which gives rise to a legitimate state interest that
would justify the government's outright denial of the development
request altogether." Second, the government must establish that
90. Id. at 389-91.
91. Id. at 391.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 392-96. The floodplain exaction failed because the city had not
explained why dedication, as opposed to merely not permitting plaintiff to
build in the floodplain, was required. Id. at 393. The pedestrian/bicycle
pathway exaction was unconstitutional since the city merely found that it
"could" offset traffic congestion, not that it "will, or is likely to." Id. at 395
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 447 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, C.J.,
dissenting)).
97. See supra Part II.B.
98. Id.
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the exaction imposed substantially advances the identified
interest, as evidenced by the finding of a nexus between the
exaction and the identified legitimate state interest.' Third, the
government must demonstrate a rough proportionality, both in
nature and extent, between the public problem and the exaction
imposed."°  The government's failure to make any one of these
three showings results in a taking under the Fifth Amendment for
which the government must pay just compensation.""
III. LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.
In Lingle,"'2 the State of Hawai'i enacted Act 257, which,
among other things, limited "the amount of rent that an oil
company may charge a lessee-dealer to [fifteen] percent of the
dealer's gross profits from gasoline sales plus [fifteen] percent of
gross sales of products other than gasoline."'0 3 Plaintiff, an oil
company, then sued the State, claiming that "the statute's rent cap
provision, on its face, effected a taking of [plaintiffl's property in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
granted summary judgment for plaintiff.' The court held that
"Act 257 fail[ed] to substantially advance a legitimate state
interest, and as such, effect[ed] an unconstitutional taking in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.""° The court
reasoned that the statute was intended to serve the legitimate
state interests of preventing "concentration of the retail gasoline
market," and the "resultant high prices for consumers.., by
maintaining the viability of independent lessee-dealers." °7
Nonetheless, the Court found that this interest was not
substantially advanced by the statute because the statute "would
not actually reduce lessee-dealers' costs or retail prices" for two
99. Id.
100. See supra Part II.C.
101. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
102. For a thorough discussion of the significance of the Lingle Court's
decision to overrule the Agins test, see D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some
Clarity: The Potential Long-term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the
Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343
(2005), and Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due
Process From Takings Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2006).
103. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-10.4(c) (1998
Cum. Supp.)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 534 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1014 (D. Haw. 1998)).
107. Id. (citing Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1009-10).
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reasons.'9 First, the "rent cap would allow incumbent lessee-
dealers, upon transferring occupancy rights to a new lessee, to
charge the incoming lessee a premium reflecting the value of the
rent reduction."" Consequently:
[T]he incoming lessee's overall expenses would be the same as in the
absence of the rent cap, so that there would be no savings to pass
along to consumers. Second, the incumbent lessees would not
benefit from the statute, "because the oil company lessors would
unilaterally raise wholesale fuel prices in order to offset the
reduction in their rental income.1 °
After an appeal to and remand from the Ninth Circuit,"' the
district court reaffirmed these conclusions, this time with the aid
of expert testimony."' On a second appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed."3
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded."' The Court
began by reaffirming the principle that the Takings Clause serves
to bar "'government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.""" The Court then reviewed its three categories
of takings tests: physical, total, and partial."' Each test "aims to
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which the government directly appropriates
private property or ousts the owner from his domain," i.e., the
exercise of the government's eminent domain power."'
Concluding its review of the three valid takings tests, the
Court then revisited the Agins test, observing that this case was
its "first opportunity to consider its validity as a freestanding
takings test.""8 The Court then held that the test "prescribes an
inquiry in the nature of due process, not a takings, test, and that it
has no proper place in [the Court's] takings jurisprudence. '"" 9 At
the outset, the Court observed that the Agins test had its roots in
due process, since Agins cited two due process cases, Euclid and
Nectow," 0 to create this takings standard."' After examining the
108. Id. (citing Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-12).
109. Id. at 534-35 (citing Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-12).
110. Id. at 535 (citing Chevron, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-14).
111. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182 at 1183 (D. Haw.
2002).
112. Id.
113. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536.
114. Id. at 548.
115. Id. at 537 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
116. Id. at 538-39.
117. Id. at 539.
118. Id. at 540.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part II.A.
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historical context which gave rise to the Agins holding, 21 the Court
observed that the Agins test is a means-ends test, which asks
"whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving
some legitimate public purpose."'23 Such an inquiry "has some
logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a regulation that
fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so
arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process
Clause."124 However, the Court explained that "such a test is not a
valid method of discerning whether private property has been
'taken' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment[,]" for at least three
reasons. 25
First, the Agins test "reveals nothing about the magnitude or
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
private property rights,"2 ' and fails to "provide any information
about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property
owners."'27 Unlike the three valid takings tests noted earlier, the
Agins test "does not help to identify those regulations whose
effects are functionally comparable to government appropriation
or invasion of private property," and is "tethered neither to the
text of the Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for
allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause."'28
In reference to the basic justification for allowing regulatory
actions to be challenged as takings, the Court pointed out the
missing nexus between a law's effectiveness and the burden which
it may impose on individuals under the Agins test:
A test that tells us nothing about the actual burden imposed on
property rights, or how that burden is allocated cannot tell us when
justice might require that the burden be spread among taxpayers
through the payment of compensation. The owner of a property
subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state
interest may be just as singled out and just as burdened as the
owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation. It would
make little sense to say that the second owner has suffered a taking
while the first has not. Likewise, an ineffective regulation may not
significantly burden property rights at all, and it may distribute any
burden broadly and evenly among property owners. The notion that
such a regulation nevertheless "takes" private property for public
use merely by virtue of its ineffectiveness or foolishness is
121. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540-41. For further discussion of reliance on these
cases in Agins, see supra Part II.A.
122. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 541-42.
123. Id. at 542.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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untenable."
29
Second, a regulation's failure to meet the Agins test
presupposes a taking:
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation's effect on private
property, the "substantially advances" inquiry probes the
regulation's underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically
prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a
taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has
acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose. The Clause expressly
requires compensation where government takes private property
"for public use." It does not bar government from interfering with
property rights, but rather requires compensation "in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking." Conversely, if
a government action is found to be impermissible - for instance
because it fails to meet the "public use" requirement or is so
arbitrary as to violate due process - that is the end of the inquiry.
No amount of compensation can authorize such action.
130
Putting these principles into practice, the Court observed how
plaintiffs case exposed the Agins test's frailties.' The Court
reasoned that it was "unclear how significantly [Act 257] actually
burdens [plaintiffs] property rights."32 Specifically, the Court
explained that despite the statute's effect of reducing plaintiffs
aggregate rental income, plaintiff could nonetheless expect "to
receive a return on its investment in [its] stations that satisfie[d]
any constitutional standard."3 ' Consequently the Court con-
cluded that plaintiff had neither argued nor established that it
had "been singled out to bear any particularly severe regulatory
burden."'34 Instead, plaintiff argued that Act 257 would "not
actually serve the [s]tate's legitimate interest in protecting
consumers against high gasoline prices." 5 Therefore, it was clear
to the Court that plaintiffs claim "[did] not sound under the
Takings Clause."'36 Indeed, plaintiff sought not just compensation,
but injunctive relief from a regulation which it alleged to be
"fundamentally arbitrary and irrational."37
Third, the Court expressed practical concerns for the Agins
test:
The Agins formula can be read to demand heightened means-ends
129. Id.
130. Id. at 543 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 544.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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review of virtually any regulation of private property. If so
interpreted, it would require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a
vast array of state and federal regulations-a task for which courts
are not well suited. Moreover, it would empower - and might often
require - courts to substitute their predictive judgments for those
of elected legislatures and expert agencies.138
Examining the heightened scrutiny applied by the district court,
the Court found those proceedings "remarkable" in view of how the
Court had "long eschewed such heightened scrutiny when
addressing substantive due process challenges to government
regulation."'39 The Court continued, "[tihe reasons for deference to
legislative judgments about the need for, and likely effectiveness
of, regulatory actions are by now well established, and we think
they are no less applicable here."' °
In short, because the Agins test is essentially a substantive
due process inquiry, because such an inquiry presupposes a
takings inquiry, and because heightened scrutiny is inappropriate
in such an inquiry, the Court held that "the 'substantially
advances' formula announced in Agins is not a valid method of
identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth Amendment
requires just compensation."' Contrary to its elimination of the
Agins test, the Court took great care not to disturb Nollan and
Dolan in any respect at all.
IV. NOLLAN AND DOLAN WERE NOT DISTURBED BY THE LINGLE
COURT'S DECISION TO OVERRULE THE AGINS TEST
In the final part of the Lingle opinion, the Court emphasized
that its decision to overrule the Agins test did "not require [it] to
disturb any of [its] prior holdings."' The Court noted that
although it had applied the Agins test in Agins itself as well as in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,"' in no case had
it ever "found a compensable taking based on such an inquiry.""'
The Court noted that, generally, its past recitations of the Agins
test "merely assumed its validity when referring to it in dicta."1
45
138. Id.
139. Id. at 545 (citations omitted).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
144. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546.
145. Id. At this point, the Court cited Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 (2002)
("[Pletitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest"), City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999) ("[A]lthough this Court has [not]
provided... a thorough explanation of the nature or applicability of the
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Still, the Court acknowledged that "[i]t might be argued that
[the Agins test] played a role in our decisions in Nollan ... and
Dolan."46 Rejecting this contention, the Court concluded that
although Nollan and Dolan quoted the Agins test, those cases did
not apply it.'47 The Court distinguished the Nollan and Dolan test
from the Agins on three points. First, the Nollan and Dolan test is
a valid takings test because it reveals the burden on a person's
property rights." Second, the Nollan and Dolan test is not a
substantive due process test. 9 Third, the Nollan and Dolan test is
a special application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. °
This Part proceeds by examining the Court's reasoning on
each of these three points in Subpart A, B, and C, respectively.
Subpart D then argues that, based on these points, the Nollan and
Dolan test's heightened scrutiny is appropriate. This Part
concludes, in Subpart E, by testing the Lingle Court's statement
that Nollan and Dolan did not apply the Agins test, by applying
the Agins test to Nollan's facts.
requirement that a regulation substantially advance legitimate public
interests ... the trial court's instructions [weire consistent with ... previous
general discussions of regulatory takings liability." (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at
834-35 & n.3)), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992) ("As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth Amendment is
violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.'"
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)), Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)
("[Petitioners] allege in this Court that the ordinance does not 'substantially
advance' a 'legitimate state interest' no matter how it is applied." (quoting,
inter alia, Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)), and United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985) ("[Olur general approach was summed
up in Agins ... where we stated that the application of land-use regulations to
a particular piece of property is a taking only 'if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests .... .'" (internal citation
omitted)). The proposition in these cases that a land-use does not work a
taking on its face if it substantially advances a legitimate state interest is
invalid after Lingle.
Arguably, the same can be said for the Court's statement in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City that "a use restriction on real
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose." 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing,
inter alia, Nectow, 277 U.S. 183). Interestingly, much like Agins, the Court
cited, among other cases, Nectow, for this point of law. See supra Part II.A.
Thus, Penn Central's "reasonably necessary" rule will likely share the fate of
the Agins test.
146. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546; see, e.g., Sarah B. Nelson, Comment, Lingle v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 281, 292 (2006) ("But even
without an explicit overruling, Lingle fatally undercuts Nollan and Dolan.").
147. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
148. Id. at 547.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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A. The Nollan and Dolan Test is a Valid Takings Test
The Takings Clause serves "to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 5' Thus, a test
that says "nothing about the actual burden imposed on property
rights," cannot tell the courts when a taking has occurred.' In
view of these principles, the Lingle Court observed, "Whereas the
'substantially advances' inquiry before us now[, i.e., the Agins
test,] is unconcerned with the degree or type of burden a
regulation places upon property, Nollan and Dolan both involved
dedications of property so onerous that, outside the exactions
context, they would be deemed per se physical takings.'. 3
Instead, the Agins test focuses solely on the effectiveness of a
land-use law.'54 Consequently, an ineffective regulation under
Agins does not signal that a taking has occurred.'5 As the Lingle
Court said, "The owner of a property subject to a regulation that
effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled
out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an
ineffective regulation."56 An ineffective regulation under the Agins
test indicates, at most, that that the law has perhaps violated due
process, since the test "has some logic in the context of a due
process challenge."57
By contrast, an ineffective exaction under the Nollan and
Dolan test necessarily means that a taking has in fact occurred.
This is because the test begins on the premise that had the
government exacted the property rights at issue outright, such
action would have certainly been held a taking.' The test thus
permits the government to avoid a compensable taking if the
government can show that the exaction is effective (in advancing a
legitimate state interest which would have justified the denial of
development).
In short, although an ineffective regulation under the Agins
test does not indicate that a taking has occurred, an ineffective
151. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
152. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542.
153. Id. at 547.
154. Id. at 542.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 543.
157. Id. at 542. Even this point is uncertain, because the Agins test
prescribes a heightened form of scrutiny, which is inappropriate in a due
process inquiry. Id. at 544-45.
158. Id. at 546; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32 (1987); see
also supra Part II.B-C.
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exaction under the Nollan and Dolan test necessarily means that
there has been a taking. Thus, unlike the Agins test, the Nollan
and Dolan test is a valid takings test, since it reveals the burden
placed on property rights. Because the Nollan and Dolan test is a
valid takings test, it follows that it is not a due process test, as a
taking presupposes "that the government has acted in pursuit of a
valid public purpose."1 9
B. The Nollan and Dolan Test is Not a Due Process Test
As stated, the Agins test is a substantive due process
inquiry.6 ° However, the Nollan and Dolan test is not. This fact is
illustrated by the differences between each test's legitimate state
interest requirement.' The Lingle Court paid careful attention to
this distinction, 2 stating: "In neither [Nollan nor Dolan] did the
Court question whether the exaction would substantially advance
some legitimate state interest. Rather, the issue was whether the
exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-use
authorities asserted would allow them to deny the permit
altogether."1" The first sentence just quoted refers to the Agins
test, which merely requires that "a regulation of private property
is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose."'6 To fail
this substantive due process inquiry, a regulation must not serve
"any" legitimate state interest.u
On the other hand, the Nollan and Dolan test calls for a
legitimate state interest which would have justified the
government's denial of the development permit altogether." The
rationale for this requirement is that if the government can deny
the development altogether because of a problem that the
development might cause, then the government can certainly
allow development and exact property rights which it will use to
address the problem. 7 An exaction fails the Nollan and Dolan
159. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
160. Id. at 540.
161. For further discussion of the importance of the legitimate state interest
requirement, see David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court:
How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed From Penn Central to
Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 523, 568 (1999) ("The Nollan/Dolan test has three parts, not two. Before
reaching nexus and proportionality, it is first necessary, according to Dolan, to
assure that the regulation is furthering a legitimate state interest.").
162. 4 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & LAND USE PRACTICE § 64.03[2]
(2005).
163. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
164. Id. at 542 (emphasis omitted and added).
165. Id. at 543.
166. Id. at 547; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836; see also supra Part II.B.
167. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
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test, then, if it fails to advance the "same" legitimate state interest
which would have justified the government's denial of the
development (in view of the potential public problem caused by the
development)." The nexus requirement serves to assure that the
"same""6 9 legitimate state interest is substantially advanced. 170
Thus, if an exaction advances some legitimate state interest but
which does not justify the denial of development, as was the case
in Nollan,7' then there is a taking, but not a substantive due
process violation. Such a violation only occurs if the exaction fails
to advance any legitimate state interest.
72
Accordingly, the Agins test is essentially a substantive due
process inquiry,'73 but the Nollan and Dolan test is not.' The
Court has consistently rejected the notion that the Nollan and
Dolan test sounds in substantive due process. For example, in
Dolan the Court said:
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent suggests that this case is actually
grounded in "substantive" due process, rather than in the view that
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. But there is no doubt
that later cases have held that the Fourteenth Amendment does
make the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the
States.'
75
Based on the foregoing, three points are clear. First, the Nollan
and Dolan test is not a due process test. Second, the Nollan and
Dolan test is a valid takings test. 6 Third, if an exaction fails the
Nollan and Dolan test, then the exaction is, essentially,
"ineffective." 7  In the context of exactions, the upshot of
ineffectiveness is that the exaction is an unconstitutional
condition.
168. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
169. Id.
170. See supra Part I.
171. See infra Part IV.E.
172. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 534. It is, of course, conceivable that an exaction
could offend due process by serving no legitimate state interest. See id. at
548-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 540.
174. Id. at 547.
175. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5. For further discussion of this point, see
infra Part IV.D, where the different burdens of proof are addressed with
respect to substantive due process and takings challenges.
176. See supra Part IV.A.
177. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
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C. Nollan and Dolan's Test is a Special Application of the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
The Nollan and Dolan test falls under the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine,'78 whereas the Agins test does not. The Court
first explained that the Nollan and Dolan test is a part of the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in Dolan."' The doctrine
holds that "government may not require a person to give up a
constitutional right ... in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit has little or no
relationship to the property." 8' In the context of exactions, the
constitutional right at issue is, of course, the right "to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use."'.' In
Nollan, the Court's implicit reliance on this doctrine was evident
when it said that "the lack of nexus between the condition and the
original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose
to ... the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid govern-
mental purpose, but without payment of compensation." 8 ' The
Court reaffirmed this view in Lingle."
The principles underlying the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine have a long history in the context of challenges to
exactions under the Takings Clause. For instance, in the 1928
case of Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment,"s the
Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated a public park exaction."
In that case, plaintiff owned a tract of land which was zoned
industrial, and proposed to build a wire factory on the land." One
month prior to plaintiffs application for the building permit, the
land was rezoned residential.'8 7 The board of adjustment none-
theless granted plaintiff a building permit to construct the
factory.' The permit was, however, subject to conditions.' 9 The
178. See Dreher, supra note 102, at 393-94 ("[Tjhe special standards
developed by the Court in Nollan and Dolan... reflected the Court's concern
that exactions may improperly force owners to waive their constitutional
rights to just compensation, and thus represent an application of the Court's
'unconstitutional conditions' doctrine." (footnotes omitted)).
179. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. Cf Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643
N.E.2d 479, 495 (N.Y. 1994) (Levine, J., dissenting) ("[11n Dolan, the majority
decision justified the application of heightened scrutiny by referring to
Nollan's adaptation of the well-settled doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions ... " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
183. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
184. 142 A. 548 (N.J. 1928).
185. Id. at 549.
186. Id. at 548-49.
187. Id. at 548.
188. Id. at 548-49.
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fourth condition stated "[that the plot of ground within one
hundred feet radius of the Belwood Park station be retained in the
B residence zone, in which no factory buildings will be erected."19
Plaintiff challenged the conditions and appealed to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, which struck the conditions.' The issue
before the court was "whether or not the imposition of these
conditions was within the power of the board of adjustment."192
The court explained that the board of adjustment does not have
authority to impose "unreasonable" conditions on a building
permit.9 The court concluded that the condition was indeed
unreasonable.' The court reasoned that it was "a roundabout
method of creating a park at the expense of the [plaintiffl." '9 The
court thus struck the condition from plaintiffs building permit.
9 6
On the other hand, the Agins test is not an application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Instead, it "says a regulation
affecting property constitutes a taking on its face solely because it
does not substantially advance a legitimate government
interest."'97 Discretionary governmental benefits are not involved.
Indeed, a land-use regulation's failure of the Agins test certainly
does not necessarily convert it into "'an out-and-out plan of
extortion.""9  Thus, the Nollan and Dolan test is a special app-
lication of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, while the
Agins test is not.
D. Because the Nollan and Dolan Test is Not a Due Process Test,
and Because it is a Special Application of the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, Heightened Scrutiny is Appropriate
As a practical matter, the importance of the preceding
discussion is that heightened scrutiny is appropriate under the
189. Id. at 549.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id. Likewise, in reviewing subdivision exactions, the Supreme Court of
Illinois framed the issue as follows:
Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be required under the guise of
a police power regulation to dedicate a portion of his property to public
use; or does this amount to a veiled exercise of the power of eminent
domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of
police regulations?
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill.
1961) (emphasis added).
197. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
198. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432
A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981)).
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Nollan and Dolan test, but not the Agins test. In the course of
dismantling the Agins test, the Court said that the test could "be
read to demand heightened means-ends review."I' Such review is
inappropriate because the Court has "long eschewed such
heightened scrutiny when addressing substantive due process
challenges to government regulation."2 "° Thus, the Agins
heightened scrutiny is inappropriate because it is a substantive
due process inquiry.
Conversely, such heightened scrutiny is clearly appropriate
under the Nollan and Dolan test. This is because the test is not a
due process test,0 1 and because it is a special application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.' With respect to due
process, in Nollan the Court emphasized the differences between
its takings and due process verbal formulations:
Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN's claim, our opinions do not
establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due
process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal
formulations in the takings field have generally been quite different.
We have required that the regulation "substantially advance" the
"legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved.., not that "the
State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted
might achieve the State's objective.". .. [T]here is no reason to
believe (and the language of our cases gives some reason to
disbelieve) that so long as the regulation of property is at issue the
standards for takings challenges, due process challenges, and equal
protection challenges are identical; any more than there is any
reason to believe that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue
the standards for due process challenges, equal protection
challenges, and First Amendment challenges are identical. 203
It is now apparent that the "substantially advances" language in
the Agins test was improvidently employed because, as the just
quoted section clarifies, such language is suitable in a takings, not
due process, test, and the Agins test is a due process inquiry. 2°2 By
contrast, the "substantially advances" language found a proper
home in the Nollan and Dolan test, because, as stated, it is a valid
takings test.20 5 Consequently, because the Nollan and Dolan test
is not a due process inquiry, °2 its heightened scrutiny, inasmuch
as it employs the "substantially advances" phrasing, is compatible
199. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
200. Id. at 545 (citations omitted).
201. See supra Part IV.B.
202. See supra Part IV.C.
203. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (emphasis omitted and added) (internal
citations omitted).
204. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
205. See supra Part IV.A.
206. See supra Part LV.B.
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with the Court's "verbal formulations in the takings field.""7
Furthermore, in reference to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, in Dolan the Court relied on the doctrine to justify its
application of heightened scrutiny:
JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent takes us to task for placing the burden
on the city to justify the required dedication. He is correct in
arguing that in evaluating most generally applicable zoning
regulations, the burden properly rests on the party challenging the
regulation to prove that it constitutes an arbitrary regulation of
property rights. Here, by contrast, the city made an adjudicative
decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on
an individual parcel. In this situation, the burden properly rests on
the city. 
s
As stated, the Agins test is essentially a due process inquiry
derived from Euclid. 9  Moreover, it does not involve the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.1 0 In consequence, the Agins
test is not suited for heightened review, insofar as the plaintiff
must carry the burden of proof. On the other hand, under the
Nollan and Dolan test, the government must shoulder the
burden.21' Therefore, unlike the Agins test, heightened scrutiny is
proper under the Nollan and Dolan test.
There is some concern that the application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of exactions 12
has negative implications for private property rights.2 ' Professor
Jerold S. Kayden has argued that "an unconstitutional conditions
analysis conflicts with Justice Scalia's property rights approach
because it posits that the owner has no entitlement whatsoever to
the new house."24 The Nollan Court appeared to agree with this
observation when it noted that "the right to build on one's own
property - even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate
permitting requirements - cannot remotely be described as a
'governmental benefit.'" 2" However, the Court reversed course in
Dolan when it explained that its holding was in fact an application
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.21" Certainly, the
government can deny development through a valid exercise of its
207. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (emphasis added).
208. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8 (citations omitted).
209. See supra Part II.A.
210. See supra Part IV.C.
211. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8.
212. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547.
213. Jerod S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game?
Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 42-43 (1991).
214. Id. at 42.
215. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
216. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374, 385.
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police power, so long as such a denial does not go "too far"217 and
require the landowner to "bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."1 8
Such a denial, of course, amounts to a taking that requires the
payment of just compensation. 9
For example, in Nollan, after concluding that if the
commission had required plaintiffs to convey an easement
outright, then such action would certainly be a taking, the Court
addressed the question of whether the commission could avoid this
result by conditioning a building permit on plaintiffs' concession of
an exaction that would serve the same purpose of denying
development altogether. 2 ' Answering in the affirmative, the Court
noted that "the [clommission unquestionably would be able to deny
[plaintiffs'] permit ... unless the denial would interfere so
drastically with [plaintiffs'] use of their property as to constitute a
taking."2 2 1  Thus, concern that private property rights will be
compromised if developmental approval is construed as a
discretionary benefit is unfounded, insofar as the government's
discretion is limited by the Takings Clause.222
In short, the Nollan and Dolan test's heightened scrutiny is
appropriate since that test does not sound in substantive due
process but instead is a special application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.
E. Nollan and Dolan did not Apply the Agins Test
The Lingle Court clearly articulated that "Nollan and Dolan
cannot be characterized as applying the 'substantially advances'
test we address today," that is, the Agins test.22 To be sure, the
Nollan Court quoted the Agins test.224 However, had the Nollan
Court applied the Agins test, the result would have been different
in Nollan. To review, the Agins test provides that a land-use law
does not work a taking on its face if it substantially advances a
legitimate state interest. Applying this standard to Nollan's facts,
and to the commission's findings in particular, the state certainly
217. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
218. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (1960).
219. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
220. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
221. Id. at 835-36 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
223. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
224. Id. at 546; see also supra Part II.B; Dreher, supra note 102, at 393
(explaining that neither Nollan nor Dolan "involved a true application of the
Agins [test]").
[40:539
2007] The Status of Nollan and Dolan after Lingle 563
has a legitimate interest in providing public access to its
beaches." Exacting a public access easement to the beach will
undeniably advance this interest. Thus, had the Nollan Court
applied the Agins test to the easement exaction, the Court would
probably not have held the easement to be a taking."6
By contrast, the easement exaction failed to pass muster
under the Nollan and Dolan test because the legitimate state
interest which might2 7 have justified the commission's outright
denial of the Nollans' request for a development permit was the
state's interest in "protecting the public's ability to see the
beach[,]" not access it.2 28 This is the reason the Nollan Court found
a "viewing spot" constitutionally permissible,2 2 9 and an easement
constitutionally repugnant.2 ' Thus, Nollan did not apply the
Agins test.
As an aside, some courts have in fact applied the Agins test to
exactions.23' These courts draw a curious distinction between
administrative and legislatively imposed exactions. 2  The basic
rationale for this approach is that the Dolan Court referred to the
exactions at issue as having been administratively imposed.2 2
225. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29.
226. This conclusion is less than certain because the Nollan Court did not
reach rough proportionality. See id. at 838 ("We can accept, for purposes of
discussion, the Commission's proposed test as to how close a 'fit' between the
condition and the burden is required, because we find that this case does not
meet even the most untailored standards.").
227. The Court assumed, "without deciding," that "protecting the public's
ability to see the beach" was a legitimate state interest. Id. at 835.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 836.
230. Id. at 838-39.
231. See Christopher T. Goodin, Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the
Distinction Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions: "A Distinction
Without A Constitutional Difference," 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 148-54 (2005).
232. Id.
233. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. In Dolan, the court stated:
The sort of land use regulations discussed in the cases just
cited ... differ in two relevant particulars from the present case. First,
they involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire
areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative decision to
condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an individual
parcel. Second, the conditions imposed were not simply a limitation on
the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that
she deed portions of the property to the city.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court later noted:
[In evaluating most generally applicable zoning regulations, the burden
properly rests on the party challenging the regulation to prove that it
constitutes an arbitrary regulation of property rights. Here, by contrast,
the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel. In this
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Thus, in the face of legislatively imposed exactions, these courts
have applied the Agins test despite the fact that the Agins test
does not remotely provide an adequate takings framework." '
These courts must reconsider their analyses of legislative
exactions now that the Agins test is unavailable.235 Given that the
Nollan and Dolan test is still good law, the choice is obvious:
Nollan and Dolan set the constitutional floor for all exactions
cases, irrespective of whether the exaction was imposed
administratively or legislatively.236
V. ALTERNATIVES TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
There are a series of alternatives to adopting
"unconstitutional conditions" as the most logical alternative to
regulatory takings jurisprudence following Lingle's abolition of the
"furthering a legitimate state interest" prong of Agins v.
Tiburon.37 First, one might argue that states like California are
situation, the burden properly rests on the city.
Id. at 391 n.8 (citing Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365) (emphasis added).
Professor John D. Echeverria maintains this view even after Lingle, basing his
position on how the Lingle Court emphasized "the fact that [Nollan and
Dolan] involved 'adjudicative' government action." See Echeverria, supra note
19, at 10583.
234. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
235. Id. at 545-46.
236. Goodin, supra note 231, at 158-67. However, one commentator has
concluded that the Nollan and Dolan test should be overruled because it
cannot be validly distinguished from the Agins test. See Nelson, supra note
146, at 290-93. Nelson argues that the Lingle Court's principal distinction
was that the exactions imposed in Nollan and Dolan were both "adjudicative,"
whereas Agins involved a legislative determination. Id. at 291. She then
rightly concludes that this distinction is invalid because "a skillfully crafted
'essential nexus' does nothing to lessen a property owner's burden; nor does
replacing an administrative official's signature with a legislative vote." Id. at
292. Absent a proper distinction, Nelson posits that agencies' judgments
should be accorded the same deference as legislative judgments, that is, under
rational basis review. Id. She then concludes that "[aisking courts to
'substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures and
expert agencies' and to 'scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state and
federal regulations' deserves a sound and explicit justification absent from
Nollan and Dolan." Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544).
This argument improperly asserts that Nollan and Dolan apply to "'a
vast array of state and federal regulations.'" Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at
544). On the contrary, those cases apply instead to a limited segment of state
and federal regulations, namely the regulations which impose land-use
exactions. And exactions fall under the Court's unconstitutional conditions
doctrine. That doctrine certainly furnishes "a sound and explicit justification"
for why the Nollan and Dolan test is analytically different from the Agins test,
see supra Part 0, as well as for why heightened scrutiny is appropriate to both
adjudicative and legislative exactions, see Goodin, supra note 231, at 158-61.
237. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545.
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free to readopt the test under their own constitution, since this
prong is more protective of property rights, as the Supreme Court
suggested for public purpose public use tests following its decision
in Kelo v. City of New London.238 Second, one might argue that
Fourteenth Amendment due process use of some version of
legitimate state interests is still viable, particularly given Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Lingle' 9 and some of the language in
both pre- and post-Lingle cases. Third, one could narrowly
construe the Lingle decision to apply only to the precise language
of Agins's first prong, since courts have used different language
arguably to the same effect. Last, one might argue that the Court
simply got it wrong in Lingle and should return to its Yee
jurisprudence by implication.24 °
A. Readoption of Agins Prong One
Whether or not there is anything left of the Agins test
following the Court's unanimous opinion in Lingle, states are free
to adopt (or readopt) it as part of their state regulatory takings
jurisprudence. There is ample precedent from the Supreme
Court's opinion in the recent eminent domain case of Kelo.24'
There, recall, the Court refused to reconsider its broad definition of
public use under the Fifth Amendment, but encouraged the states
to adopt a more strict standard if they so chose242 (and indeed
many did).2" As in Kelo, the Court in Lingle removes a barrier to
government taking of property without compensation. States are
always free to increase - but not decrease - the level of such
protection. Thus, for example, the California State Constitution's
Article I, § 19 provides for compensation in the event of
government taking or damaging of private property could be
interpreted as requiring the substantial advancing of a legitimate
state interest for regulations which restrict the use of private
238. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
239. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
240. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 84, 859-60 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
241. 545 U.S. 469.
242. Id. at 498. The Court in Kelo stated:
We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed,
many States already impose 'public use' requirements that are stricter
than the federal baseline. Some of these requirements have been
established as a matter of state constitutional law, while others are
expressed in state eminent domain statutes that carefully limit the
grounds upon which takings may be exercised."
Id. (footnotes omitted)).
243. See David Schultz, What's Yours Can be Mine: Are There Any Private
Takings After Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY
195, 223-34 (2006).
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property through the exercise of the police power - in other words,
in a potential regulatory taking context.2
B. Prong One of Agins and Due Process
A fair reading of the Lingle decision demonstrates that the
Court eliminated Agins' "substantially advances" test only for
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings cases. Both the majority
opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence clearly mean to leave
some version of the test intact in Fourteenth Amendment due
process inquiries. Justice Kennedy: "This separate writing is to
note that today's decision does not foreclose the possibility that a
regulation might be so arbitrary or irrational as to violate due
process." 245  The majority: "We conclude that this formula pre-
scribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings,
test, and that it has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence."2 6 Further support can be gleaned from Judge
Fletcher's dissent in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Lingle
decision, where he states that there are two different
constitutional tests ordinarily applied to rent and price control:
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable (presumably Fourteenth-
Amendment due process) and the "substantially advances" test
which he states is ordinarily applied to zoning and other land use
regulations, by which he presumably means a Fifth Amendment
test.2 7 He correctly observes that applying the latter probably
comes from dicta in Yee and laments that application and the
result that "virtually all rent control laws in the Ninth Circuit are
now subject to the 'substantially advances a legitimate state
interest' test" after Richardson and the then-current Lingle
decision, which he regards as a mistake.2  One can certainly read
two subsequent California cases, one in federal court and one in
state court, that way, though the emphasis in each was on Fifth
Amendment challenges rather than Fourteenth Amendment
249
ones.
244. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. But see Small Property Owners of San
Francisco v. City and County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 128-29
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the substantially advances test as a takings test
in favor of a due process argument).
245. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 540 (majority opinion).
247. See Lingle, 363 F.3d at 859-60 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 860-61.
249. See Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola, No. 04-13722,
2005 WL 177427 (N.D. Cal., July 26, 2005); Los Altos El Granada Investors v.
City of Capitola, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also Allegretti &
Co. v. County of Imperial, 42 Cal Rptr. 3d 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), in which
plaintiff argued that the first prong of Agins was still part of California taking
law based on the California Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Landgate, Inc. v.
[40:539
The Status of Nollan and Dolan after Lingle
For example, in Kennedy v. City of Seattle,25 ° the owners of
moorage sites wanted to evict their tenant, but could not do so
under a rent control ordinance. 251 The ordinance made "it
unlawful for a moorage owner to give notice to a houseboat owner
to remove his houseboat, or to evict a houseboat except for six
specific reasons. " 21' The Washington Supreme Court held that two
of those reasons, the only two that appeared to permit the owner
to evict through no fault of his tenant,"' rendered the ordinance
unconstitutional, because both were illusory, and consequently
confiscatory under section 16 of article 1 to the Washington
Constitution. 4
The first provision in the ordinance purported to allow an
owner to evict a tenant if the "owner, with 6 months' notice, wishes
to occupy the moorage site and finds the displaced houseboat
owner another lawful moorage site within the City of Seattle."'
The court observed that while this provision offered an option in
theory, the provision was impossible to utilize in practice, because
there were no other moorage sites available within the City of
Seattle.256 "While reasonable restrictions on the use of property by
an owner are proper, to require a landlord to locate a nonexistent
moorage for a houseboat owner before the residence of the landlord
can be moved to the property, is not reasonable."257
The second provision of the ordinance permitted an owner of a
mooring to evict his tenant in order to make a "change in use of
the moorage ... with 6 months' advanced notice." 2' This provision
was also illusory, because the permissible uses in the zone were
California Coastal Com., 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998). The court of appeals did
hold that Landgate required it to objectively assess whether there exists a
'sufficient connection between the land use regulation in question and a
legitimate governmental purpose" (which it found). Allegretti, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 139. Again, in Small Property Owners of San Francisco, the court in a
backhanded fashion appeared to invite due process rather than Fifth
Amendment takings in challenging an ordinance requiring interest on tenant
security deposits, by observing that "[iut is far more logical to conclude that
regulation of this sort might be declared invalid as violative of due process
than that the government should give back the money it legitimately took." 47
Cal Rptr. 3d at 129 n.6.
250. 617 P.2d 713 (Wash. 1980).
251. Id. at 715.
252. Id. at 716.
253. The ordinance included provisions that allowed the owner to evict his
tenant where the tenant failed to pay rent, breached a covenant, failed to
abate a nuisance, or failed to execute a lease at a reasonable rent. Id.
254. Id. at 719-20.
255. Id. at 716 (emphasis omitted).
256. Id. at 719.
257. Id. (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 716 (emphasis omitted).
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floating home moorages and nonprofit yacht clubs. 9 In other
words, the provision only allowed an owner to evict his tenant if he
wanted to open a yacht club." The yacht club use, the court
explained, was "so highly restrictive as to tilt the balance so that
in fact is [was] a taking.""6 ' The use was unreasonable for the
added reason that "the establishment of any kind of a yacht club
on a small restricted moorage with difficult access is no more a
reasonable possibility than finding a nonexistent moorage." 6'
Another comes from a reasonable rate of return case from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of
Rocklin.68 The ordinance only allowed rent increases for the
recovery of reasonable expenditures.' Plaintiff, a mobile home
park owner, sued alleging that the ordinance deprived it of a fair
and reasonable return on its investment by limiting rent increases
to capital improvements.
Writing for the court, Judge Alex Kozinski recited the general
rule that "every dollar the landlord puts into the property by way
of capital improvements constitutes an investment in the property
for which a 'fair and reasonable' return must be allowed.
"26
6
"Breaking even is not enough; the law must provide for a profit on
one's investment. " 267 He reasoned that the rent control ordinance:
must do more than simply allow plaintiff to pass through certain
costs; it must ensure that plaintiff will receive a reasonable return
on those expenditures. To the extent plaintiff alleges that the rent
increases allowed on account of capital improvements merely offset
the cost of those improvements (or less), it has stated a claim for a
268violation of substantive due process....
Of course, the burden in proving a violation of substantive
due process is high for the plaintiff. Any reasonable ground for the
challenged regulation will generally result in judicial deference to
the state or local government which passed it. However, many if
not most of the challenged land use regulations are local
governmental in nature, not state, Lingle notwithstanding. A
259. Id. at 719-20.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 720.
262. Id.
263. 938 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated by 506 U.S. 802 (1992), adhered to
in part by 987 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1993).
264. Id. at 953.
265. Id. at 958.
266. See id. (discussing Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508, 512-
14 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1990)).
267. Id
268. Id. (internal citation omitted).
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worthwhile argument, made relatively recently by Professors Dan
Tarlock and Dan Mandelker in their excellent article, is to
abandon such deference - or at least to vastly reduce it - for
local government legislation on the ground that the local
government is far more easily captured by special interests,
particularly those favoring regulation of landowners who wish to
develop land, than state legislators. 69
C. Lingle Narrowed: Apply it to "Substantially Advances a
Legitimate State Interest" Verbatim
Courts have used a variety of phrases in the application of
some version (arguably) of the "substantially advances" test,
including nexus-like wording in cases besides the obvious ones
over exactions and impact fees as in Nollan and Dolan. Thus, for
example, in Allegretti discussed above, the court discusses
assessing whether there is a "sufficient connection between the
land use regulation in question and a legitimate governmental
purpose."27
D. The Court Got It Wrong in Lingle and Should Reconsider
There is commentary suggesting that the Court badly
muddled the background and rationale for the "substantially
advances" test.271 This is the argument that Richard Epstein
cogently makes in his article, which is part of this symposium.7 '
Epstein further argues that the Court, and particularly Justice
O'Connor, fails altogether to either appreciate or deal with the
economic implications of Lingle and, for that matter, its regulatory
takings jurisprudence generally.
E. Use the New Definitions of "Character of the Governmental
Action" From Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York
It is no secret that what everyone thought the U.S. Supreme
Court meant in the "character of the governmental action"
regulatory takings criteria posited in Penn Central has morphed
into an investigation of government rationale and purpose for
269. Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land Use Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992).
270. Allegretti & Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 139.
271. See R.S. Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron
on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB. LAW. 437 (2006); Richard A. Epstein,
Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741
(1988); Brief of the CATO Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (No. 04-163).
272. Richard Epstein, From Penn Central to Linglel: The Long Road
Backward, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 601 (2007).
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imposing a land use regulation in the first place. Since the Lingle
decision purports to leave the Court's previous takings
jurisprudence intact, and in particular the partial regulatory
taking criteria in Penn Central, perhaps we should take them at
their word and suggest an investigation into the equivalent of
legitimate state interest under this so-called second prong or
criteria in that case.27 3
Indeed, Dale Whitman in his article which is part of this
symposium suggests that the third criterion for regulatory takings
under Penn Central (the character of the governmental action) is
destroyed under any "serious" reading of Lingle.274 He never-
theless suggests later that the second prong of Agins could be
construed to be alive and well under this third Penn Central
criterion if it is read (as it is by many commentators today) as
meaning to address more than simply whether the governmental
action represents a physical or regulatory taking, which
contextually Brennan implies in his majority opinion.275
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed and supported the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the Nollan and Dolan test remains a viable
takings test after Lingle. It is clear that Nollan and Dolan quoted
the Agins test.276 It is equally clear that the Nollan and Dolan test
is different from the Agins test. The Agins test reveals nothing
about the extent to which a person's property rights are burdened
by a land-use regulation.27 7 On the other hand, the Nollan and
Dolan test begins with the premise that the exaction would
undoubtedly be a taking in any other context. 278 Both the Agins
test and the Nollan and Dolan test gauge effectiveness.279
273. Radford, supra note 271; R.S. Radford, Does Rent Control Fail to
Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests - And Why Does it Matter
After Lingle?, SLO12 ALI-ABA 205 (2005); Steven J. Eagle, "Character" as
"Worthiness": A New Meaning for Penn Central's Third Test?, 27 No. 6 ZONING
& PLANNING L. REP. (2004); Steven J. Eagle, "Character of the Governmental
Action" in takings Law: Past, Present, and Future, SJ052 ALI-ABA 459 (2004);
John D. Echeverria, The "Character" Factor in Regulatory Takings Analysis,
SK081 ALI-ABA 143 (2005). But see John D. Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The
U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy, 35 ENVLT. L. REP. 10577, 10582
(2005); Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the
Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Takings Analysis, U. HAW. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
274. Dale Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings
Doctrine, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 581, 582 (2007).
275. Id. at 588-89.
276. See supra Part II.B.
277. See supra Part III.
278. See supra Part IV.A.
279. See supra Part IV.B.
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However, ineffectiveness under the Agins test means that a land-
use law failed to substantially advance any legitimate state
interest.28° By contrast, ineffectiveness under the Nollan and
Dolan test means that an exaction failed to substantially advance
a legitimate state interest which would have justified the denial of
development. 1 Moreover, whereas an ineffective regulation under
the Agins test offends due process, 2s2 an ineffective regulation
under the Nollan and Dolan test offends the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and thus works a taking."3 Because the
Nollan and Dolan test is not a substantive due process inquiry,
and because it is a special application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine,2 0  the heightened scrutiny it applies is
appropriate. 28 6 For these reasons, Nollan and Dolan did not apply
the Agins test.2"7 Accordingly, the Nollan and Dolan test was not
disturbed by the Lingle Court's decision to overrule the Agins test.
This Article has also suggested alternatives to adopting
"unconstitutional conditions" as the most logical alternative to
regulatory takings jurisprudence following Lingle's abolition of the
"furthering a legitimate state interest" prong of Agins. The states
are free to readopt the Agins test under their own constitution,
since the states are only prohibited from diminishing, not
heightening, the Federal constitutional floor.2 s Or the Agins test
may find a proper home in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.2 8 The Court suggested as much in Lingle. 9° One
could argue for the application of the "substantially advances" test
in the different terms used by courts across the country.29 One
might also argue that the Court reached the wrong result in Lingle
and should return to its Yee jurisprudence by implication.292
Lastly, there is the argument that the Agins test is effectuated
through the character of the governmental action factor in a Penn
Central analysis.293 All of these alternatives may be viable options
after Lingle.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra Part IV.C.
284. See supra Part IV.B.
285. See supra Part IV.C.
286. See supra Part IV.D.
287. See supra Part IV.
288. See supra Part V.A.
289. See supra Part V.B.
290. Id.
291. See supra Part V.C.
292. See supra Part V.D.
293. See supra Part V.E.
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